![]() ![]() Perhaps a height-phobic stepping on a glass platform deserves different treatment to a hesitant stepper. On the contextual view, which analysis applies to which case depends on the discordancy case at hand. This paper defends what I call the ‘contextual view’, where I argue that overturning this assumption of uniformity leads to more nuanced account of belief-ascription. Most advocates of the different positions, indeed, assume that their favoured analysis will explain the whole range of discordancy cases. Others think that belief explains all the discordancy cases, while others argue that in-between belief does the trick, and so on. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances by introducing a controversial new cognitive category-associative clusters called ‘alief’. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. ![]() In this paper, I will argue that as a result of the drive to achieve internal coherence, we may acquire the implicit belief that not-P, while still consciously holding a particular explicit belief that P. Borrowing from empirical observations that demonstrate internal coherence occurring experimentally in the acquisition of explicit beliefs, I propose that this process operates similarly in the acquisition of implicit beliefs. Once achieved, internal coherence allows the subject to neglect ambiguity and suppress doubt so that a neat and tidier picture of the world emerges. This mechanism filters information in the environment, selecting inputs that cohere with an existing belief set, and discarding those that do not. In this paper, I propose that this discord may be explained by a deeply rooted and inherent mechanism responsible for the acquisition of beliefs: internal coherence. How should we explain instances in which we are disposed to act in ways discordant with our conscious beliefs? We might believe that all races are equal (P), yet when we examine our automatic and implicit behaviors, they point to an attitude of inequality (not-P).
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